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Increasing global instability coupled with increasing military budgetary 
constraints has prompted the Department of Defense (DOD) to revise the 2014 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). This revision listed peacekeeping operations, 
humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief as top priorities in providing long-term global 
security and economic stability. These operations support the strategic objective to build 
global security by projecting U.S. influence and deterring aggression as outlined in the 
2012 Defensive Strategic Guidance (United States Department of Defense, 2014). 
Historically, the execution of proactive measures to reduce global instability, including 
peacekeeping and HA/DR operations, represents a 66 percent cost reduction when 
compared to the reactive deployment of conventional forces in to a kinetic environment 
(Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2007). This preventative solution provides a 
cost effective means to protect the nation’s interest while maintaining a deterrent posture 
through global power projection. 
The United States Navy and Marine Corps are structured to provide the critical 
capabilities necessary to meet non-conventional operations. The attachment of a Marine 
Expeditionary Group (MEU) to a U.S. Navy Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) will 
contain at least three surface ships, 30+ aircraft (fixed and rotor wing) and approximately 
4,500 Sailors and Marines (HQMC, 2015). An ARG can land a Marine Expeditionary 
Unit (MEU), Special Operations Capable (SOC), ashore that is able to conduct missions 
throughout the range of military operations (ROMO). The MEU stands as the primary 
landing force of the United States and is outfitted with the necessary personnel and 
equipment to provide an expeditionary rapid response capability that protects national 
interests (HQMC, 2015). The same capabilities leveraged to respond to enemy threats are 
also effective at providing critical support during the initial stages of HA/DR operations. 
Emerging regional military capabilities, rapidly expanding commerce and geo-
political interests have created a dynamic environment within the Asia-Pacific region. 
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Potential for instability within this region is accentuated by constant threat include 
earthquakes, tsunamis and typhoons. The Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) defines a disaster as an event resulting in 100 human deaths or injuries or 
$1 million in damage (Apte, 2009). 
Developing nations that are unprepared for natural disasters experience 
catastrophic losses, which increases their vulnerability to adversarial influence. 
Earthquake frequency and magnitude data gathered from the International Disaster 
Database (EM-DAT) for the Indonesia/Sumatra region is shown in Figure 1. This data 
demonstrates a relatively constant magnitude with an increasing frequency.    
Figure 1.  Illustration of the Patterns of Seismic Activity in the  
Indonesian / Sumatra Region 
 
Adapted from EM-DAT, “Indonesia and Sumatra earthquakes frequency and magnitude,” 
2012, http://www.emdat.be/database. 
To mitigate this threat, Indonesia is increasing its involvement in disaster relief 
operational missions with their armed forces while continuing to leverage the 
 3
international community for advanced warning systems for earthquakes and tsunamis. 
Indonesia is also the founding member of a multilateral security architecture, which 
includes the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore (ASEAN, 2015). This created 
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Asia-Pacific region. The support 
for the ASEAN from the United States includes a 60 percent increase of naval assets 
operating in the Asia-Pacific region by 2020 (QDR, 2014). This pivot will facilitate 
“HA/DR, partnerships capability building, counter-piracy, search and rescue, and 
bilateral and multilateral confidence-building” (Bower et al., 2015, p. 35). The Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is an essential subcomponent in this strategic effort and 
provides a wide range of options to cater to specific needs.  
Vulnerabilities exhibited by developing countries exposed to natural disasters 
drive the need for the efficient implementation of HA/DR response activities. This leads 
us to believe that despite the regional gains in HA/DR preparedness, in the event of a 
significant natural disaster in the Sumatra or Indonesian region there will be a shortfall of 
capabilities and resource in the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief supplied by the 
Indonesian Navy. Once identified, one of the best strategies will be to reduce this gap 
through the tailored loading and pre-positioning of USMC MEU and Maritime 
Prepositioned Assets.   
B. BACKGROUND 
This project aims to identify and compare the critical requirements for HA/DR 
operations in relation to the capabilities provided by MEU, Maritime Prepositioned 
Forces (MPF) and Indonesian Naval assets. The methodology used to capture and 
analyze this information was derived from the traditional concept of supply and demand, 
applied to a five phase operational template. Phase-one of HA/DR operations 
concentrates on life-saving efforts while phase two focuses on relief operations to include 
the distribution of supplies and the restoration of critical infrastructure elements such as 
electricity and roadways. Phases three through five are centered on restoration, 
stabilization, and recovery efforts after the departure of supporting military forces from 
the affected region. Figure 2 is a linear depiction of these five phases, but in practice 
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there is a potential for significant overlap in scope and resource allocation throughout 
each phase transitions.   
Figure 2.  The Five Phases of HA/DR Operations 
 
 
Adapted from Cecchine et al., “The U.S. Military Response to the 2010 Haiti Earthquake 
–Considerations for Army Leaders,” RAND, 2013, http://www.rand.org/ 
RAND_RR304.pdf. 
The capabilities and assets of the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and MEU can 
support these phases in a limited capacity. Phase one operations focus solely on the 
preservation of human life and therefore require extensive medical support. Medical 
personnel, equipment, facilities and transportation account for the bulk of requirements 
during this phase and are the most critical elements in HA/DR operations. The duration 
and extent of supporting operations was determined by analyzing recent HA/DR 
operations (Cecchine et al., 2013). A United States response to HA/DR operations is 
initiated by the supported nation. This request can come through the State Department or 
through an existing Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in which support for HA/DR has 
been previously agreed upon between the United States and the supported nation. While 
the President and the Secretary of Defense authorize the use of military assets to support 
HA/DR operations, the regional combatant-commander has the authority to determine the 




The goal of our research project is to identify and compare the expected demand 
of a notional, yet regionally probable, HA/DR scenario with the available supply and 
current response capabilities of the Indonesian Navy and the USMC MEU. We identified 
capability gaps by utilizing historical data combined with an analysis of current 
organizational capabilities. Indonesia’s potential assistance requirement is captured by 
three major HA/DR events: the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, the 2006 
Yogyakarta earthquake and the 2009 Padang earthquake. This examination is augmented 
by a review of the current response capabilities of the Indonesian Navy to determine a 
notional scenario for anticipated demand. Additionally, our analysis includes  the USMC 
operational response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and 
tsunami in Japan, and the 2015 Nepal earthquake. These operations highlight the recent 
capabilities of the U.S. Marine Corps with an emphasis on the MEU as the first responder 
to HA/DR scenarios. The first study provides demand data and the second study provides 
potential supply data. Comparing the two will identify supply shortfalls of the affected 
region, the gap.   
B. DATA COLLECTION 
Our analysis of Indonesian and USMC Operations includes open source After 
Action Reports (AARs), case studies, and lessons learned from historical HA/DR 
operations. HA/DR demand data is collected from disasters in the Indonesian region. 
Organizational data for the Indonesian Navy, Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Laut 
(TNI AL) and United States Marine Corps MEU is gathered from open-source archives 
and compiled in order to identify potential HA/DR gaps between supply and demand.   
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The last decade has shown a dramatic rise in global humanitarian disasters. These 
disasters range from earthquakes and floods, to drought, famine, civil war and viral 
epidemics. A similar increase has taken place within the research, published literature, 
and planning between nations in order to detect and respond to these disasters. The Naval 
Warfare Development Center (NWDC) breaks Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster 
Relief (HA/DR) into the following components: 
1. Humanitarian Assistance 
The Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) defines humanitarian 
assistance as, “programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade 
disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation 
that might present serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of 
property”  (NWDC, 2005, p. 3 of glossary). 
2. Disaster Relief 
The NWDC also defines disaster relief as “prompt aid that can be used to alleviate 
the suffering of disaster victims. Normally it includes humanitarian services and 
transportation; the provision of food, clothing, medicine, beds and bedding; temporary 
shelter and housing; the furnishing of medical material and medical and technical 
personnel; and making repairs to essential services” (NWDC, 2005, p. 2 of glossary). 
Of the documented global disasters, over 60% have taken place in the Asia-
Pacific region (Moroney, Pezard, Miller, Engstrom, & Doll, 2013). With the total number 
of events on the rise, and the preponderance of these events taking place in the Asia-
Pacific region, we have focused our research on the collaborative response potential of 
the TNI AL and the USMC MEU when dealing with HA/DR events.   
Throughout our studies, the literature is conclusive that conducting any HA/DR 
mission is difficult and complex. Additional themes discussed throughout our research 
include: 
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 Asset pre-positioning and infrastructure development for assistance 
in disaster response. 
 Understanding capabilities and competencies of responding units 
and dissemination this information prior to the HA/DR event. 
 Mission success often relies upon the establishment of cooperative 
and collaborative relationships and networks to include public-private 
sector cooperation, military-nonmilitary cooperation, and military-military 
partnerships. 
3. Pre-positioning and Preparation 
Response to disaster operations is typically dependent on the logistic flow of 
relief items through a response supply chain system. The humanitarian logistics process 
can be divided into three parts. These include the preparedness before the occurrence of a 
disaster, an immediate response after the occurrence of a disaster, and the enduring 
recovery effort post-disaster (Apte, 2009). Figure 3 graphically depicts this three tiered 
model.   
Figure 3.  Timeline of the Humanitarian Supply Chain 
 
 
Adapted from Apte, A., “Humanitarian logistics: A new field of research and action.” 
Foundations and Trends in Technology, Information, and Operations Management, 3(1), 






















Strategic preparedness initiated prior to the onset of a natural disaster is essential 
to the successful execution of HA/DR response operations. Figure 3 is depicting asset 
pre-positioning, infrastructure preparation and the development of analytical models as 
components of the preparedness phase (Salmeron & Apte, 2009). Mitigation is the fourth 
step in the disaster management cycle, and serves as precursor to preparedness, response, 
and rehabilitation (Tomasini & Wassenhove, 2009). Mitigation is most beneficial when 
dealing with non-natural disasters and can include the diplomatic prevention of wars, 
agricultural innovations to reduce the risk of famine, the stabilization of currencies and 
any other way to preempt and avoid a humanitarian disaster.     
a. Asset Pre-positioning 
Pre-positioning is especially useful when disasters are seasonal or predictable in 
location (Apte, 2009). The United States military has an afloat pre-positioning program 
through its Military Sealift Command (MSC) that “places military equipment and 
supplies aboard ships located in key ocean areas to ensure rapid availability during a 
major theater war, a humanitarian operation or other contingency” (MSC, 2015). MSC 
pre-positioning ships primarily contain military equipment, some of which is suitable for 
HA/DR response. Within the United States, the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) created a Prepositioned Equipment Program (PEP) in 2001 to provide supplies 
in 10 geographic locations. These modules were designed to provide expedited response 
to national disasters or terrorist attacks. Each of the geographic locations contained 
standardized equipment pods. “Currently, each pod contains personal protective, 
decontamination, detection, technical search and rescue, law enforcement, interoperable 
communications and other emergency response equipment, capable of outfitting 
firefighters, law enforcement and emergency medical personnel” (FEMA PEP, 2012). In 
2012, an internal review was conducted of PEP with recommendations for revision or 
removal of the program on a cost / benefit analysis decision. ASEAN countries have 
discussed a pre-positioning program for HA/DR response and have warehouses located in 
multiple locations for the consolidation and distribution of emergency supplies, but have 
not formally begun this process.    
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b. Infrastructure Development 
Prior to a disaster, preparedness activities should be done with all parts and 
components of communities (Coppola, 2011). Organizations, individuals, emergency 
response agencies, government officials, business players, and citizens are components 
that should conduct preparedness activities to reduce the impacts of disasters (Coppola, 
2011). The collective approach to preparation involves improving existing roads, bridges, 
air and seaports, as well as the creation and implementation of disaster early warning and 
communication systems. The National Research Council (NRC) defines resilience as “the 
ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from, and more successfully adapt to 
adverse events” (NRC, 2015). Examples of this resiliency can include the creation of 
Emergency Operations Plans (EOPs), Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and 
conducting training and exercises.   
4. Capabilities and Competencies 
The response to an HA/DR scenario involves members of the affected country, 
external militaries, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). These organizations 
includes separate ministries and administrations within a government, distinct branches 
of militaries, and a large number of separate NGOs and aid organizations. The 
appropriate application of each organization’s inherent capabilities increases the 
effectiveness of HA/DR response.  Six primary essential services and capabilities in a 
















Figure 4.  Humanitarian and Military Core Competencies 
 
Adapted from Apte & Yoho, “Capabilities and competencies in humanitarian operations   
(NPS-LM-12–175),” NPS Archives, 2012, http://www.acquisitionresearch.net/ 
files/FY2012/NPS-AM-12–175.pdf. 
5. Cooperation and Collaboration 
Our research focuses on the cooperation and collaboration required to conduct a 
joint HA/DR response mission led by the Indonesian Navy and the United States Marine 
Corps. Indonesia is frequently struck by natural disasters affecting a significant portion of 
their population. The United States Military has assets forward deployed and based 
within the United States capable of HA/DR response. Unique assets including ships, 
trained personnel and a willingness to assist in international relief operations will allow 
the United States to remain a major player in disaster relief response situations (Moroney 
et al., 2013). When the MEU is forward deployed during contingency operations they are 
expected to accomplish the following primary functions: “conducting amphibious 
operations, crisis response and limited contingency operations, to include enabling the 
 11
introduction of follow on forces, and, designated special operations, in order to support 
the theater requirements of Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC)” (USMC, 2009, 
p. 4). To prepare for these deployment operations, training exercises are conducted to 
ensure that the Marines and Sailors are capable of performing vital HA/DR specific 
mission sets which include, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) and 
Humanitarian Assistance (24th MEU, 2015). 
Indonesia has created HA/DR guidelines to ensure that TNI AL adheres to 
regulations of the Indonesian Armed Forces Commander. This regulation directs the 
cooperation between the Indonesian armed forces and the militaries of other countries in 
disaster relief efforts (Tentara Nasional Indonesia [TNI] Commander Regulations, 2009). 
The Government of Indonesia (GoI) uses the Indonesian Armed forces to mitigate the 
effects of natural disasters. The GoI also requests HA/DR assistance through external 
organizations and allied militaries (TNI Commander Regulations, 2009). TNI AL 
integrates foreign military aid by establishing Liaison Officers (LNOs) for naval warships 
or Marine Corps units of foreign countries. After LNO integration, maps of both sea and 
land approaches at the disaster site are created and promulgated. Next, anchorage 
positions, a description of the shoreline, and the nearest resupply port are established.   
Lastly, warships, marine and air units are prepared and deployed to support the HA/DR 
response. Additionally, communication networks must be established and coordinated 
with all responding parties through the Disaster Emergency Response Command (TNI 
Commander Regulations, 2009). 
The USMC MEU and the Indonesian Navy have developed pre-disaster training 
and post-disaster reaction plans to mitigate many of the difficulties in coordinating a 
humanitarian disaster response. We believe that additional study of the capabilities of 
both nations will identify potential gaps in supply and demand and increase their 
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III. HA/DR DEMAND IN SOUTH PACIFIC REGION 
A. INTRODUCTION TO HA/DR DEMAND 
In this chapter, we analyze three HA/DR operations in the South-Pacific region to 
identify demand patterns and project critical requirements during the initial phases of 
disaster response operations. The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami provides the historical 
context relating to the importance of communication in reducing medical requirements 
and providing sustenance to the local populace. The 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake 
demonstrates how improvements in logistical support directly impact the distribution of 
essential goods. Finally, the 2009 Padang earthquake provides insight on the importance 
of airlift capabilities.  
B. INDIAN OCEAN TSUNAMI (2004) 
Historical data highlights the influence that sustained cultural resiliency has in 
areas plagued by reoccurring natural disasters. In 2004, the Indian Ocean tsunami 
resulted in millions of dollars damages yet only 7 people were killed on the mostly native 
Simeulue Island. The high tourist population in Aceh Besar however, resulted in 
thousands of casualties. The large variation in the death toll between these two areas can 
be attributed to the cultural resiliency. The knowledge and experience gained from the 
tsunami of 1907 by local elders was passed throughout the island population, which 
prompted the locals to seek shelter from the impending tsunami in 2004 (McAdoo, 
Dengler, Prasetya & Titov, 2006). The inhabitants of Jantho lacked the cultural resiliency 
of the Simeulue population, and as a result, suffered far more casualties. Today, 
communication technology including early warning and mass populace notification 
systems can initiate immediate response measures and provided critical information 
during disasters.  
The 2004 earthquake and tsunami also exposed additional shortfalls related to the 
logistic distribution of critical supplies. Indonesian had insufficient infrastructure to 
respond to the 2004 disaster, particularly to conduct the last-mile distribution of aid 
material. The ability to provide sustainable, last-mile logistics management and the use of 
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commercial supply chain assets to facilitate disaster management operations were key 
capabilities required by Indonesia to better respond to future disasters (Economist 
Intelligence Unit [EIU], 2005). In this case, the implementation of logistic distribution 
systems shows the vital role of military employment followed by Inter-Governmental 
Organizations (IGOs) then Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) locally and 
internationally. Many lessons learned from this incident include the ability to provide 
sustainable, last-mile logistics management and the use of commercial supply chain 
assets to further facilitate disaster management operations based on the scale of the 
disaster (EIU, 2005). 
Another important aspect of effective relief efforts concerns the immediate care of 
affected populations including mortuary affairs, and the provision of food, water, clothes, 
shelter, medical care, and counseling (Fritz Institute, 2005a, 2005c). 
Table 1 is an illustration that the largest percentage of aid received was provided 
by private individuals within the first 48 hours of humanitarian response. Comparatively, 
the government and religious organizations provided much smaller contributions, while 
the corporate sector provided little to no HA/DR response. Additionally, our research 
revealed that the initial relief efforts were slow to build temporary shelters, resulting in 
millions of displaced persons over a nine month period. This situation was further 
exacerbated by a lack of heavy equipment, rotary airlift and ground logistical support 
during the reestablishment of habitat, sustenance and infrastructure. Lastly, the lack of 
emergency planning and the restoration of lines of communication further prevented the 
efficient HA/DR response (TNI Information Center, 2005a). 
The number of victims based on category and location as a result of the 2004 
Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami are shown in Table 2. This information is utilized 








Table 1.   Affected Families Recall Service Providers during the First 48 Hours  
Post-disaster in Aceh Province* 
 
 
* Numbers are presented in percentage (%).  Adapted from Fritz Institute, “Recipients 
perceptions of aid effectiveness: Rescue, relief, and rehabilitation in tsunami affected 






























Table 2.   Affected Populations in the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake  
and Tsunami, Aceh Province 
  The 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami 
District Name Death Missing Injured Suffered Displaced 
SIMEULUE 7 1 1 1 22849 
ACEH SINGKIL 0 28 28 28 0 
ACEH SELATAN 6 0 0 0 17630 
ACEH TENGGARA 26 146 146 146 0 
ACEH TIMUR 224 0 0 0 2356 
ACEH TENGAH 192 7 7 7 4005 
ACEH 
BARAT/MEULABOH 11830 3024 3024 3024 59584 
ACEH BESAR 47784 0 0 0 116984 
PIDIE 4646 1463 1463 1463 31078 
BIREUEN 1202 59 59 59 26758 
ACEH UTARA 2238 488 488 488 28268 
ACEH BARAT DAYA 9 0 0 0 13600 
GAYO LUES 3 0 0 0 293 
ACEH TAMIANG 0 4 4 4 3100 
NAGAN RAYA 493 845 845 845 10659 
ACEH JAYA 19661 143 143 143 29273 
BENER MERIAH 10 0 0 0 1204 
PIDIE JAYA 77804 0 0 0 34146 
BANDA ACEH 12 2 2 2 3939 
SABANG 0 0 0 0 10370 
LANGSA 394 10 10 10 20084 
LHOKSEUMAWE 85436 85436 85436 85436 85436 
SUBULUSSALAM 34064 34064 34064 34064 34064 
TOTALS 286041 125720 125720 125720 555680 
 
Adapted from Indonesia National Board of Disaster Management (Badan Nasional 









C. YOGYAKARTA EARTHQUAKE (2006) 
On May 27, 2006, a 6.3-magnitude earthquake struck the Yogyakarta region of 
Indonesia resulting in over 600,000 of displaced inhabitants. Palang Merah Indonesia 
(PMI) provided initial disaster response by distributing surplus supplies from the 2004 
and 2005 tsunamis. This material provided critical supplies for 1,000 families and 
established the foundation for follow-on supply chain operations (Charles, Gatignon, & 
Van Wassenhove, 2011).  
Emergency Response Units (ERU) provided personnel and equipment support, 
which greatly assisted the coordination and distribution of essential supplies. The rapid 
restoration of the Yogyakarta International Airport and the availably of supporting 
equipment proved were listed as essential elements during the first 48 hours of response 
operations. The lack of a centralized warehouse to store essential goods also placed a 
huge strain on logistic operations. By June 7, PMI and ERU personnel had established a 
robust supply chain to process and deliver the influx of in-kind donations. Humanitarian 
Logistics Software (HLS) and the Disaster Management and Information System (DMIS) 
standardized and consolidated record keeping procedures and ensured strict adherence to 
the established standard processes (Charles et al., 2011).   
These efforts resulted in a 50 percent improvement in number of families who 
received partial supply packages within the first two months of response operations with 
compared to 2004 tsunami. Days to activate end to end supply chain was decreased by 
15 days, while order lead time was reduced from 30 to 16 days (Charles et al., 2011). The 
improvements experiment the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake demonstrates the importance 
of logistical support equipment, personnel and communication.  
D. PADANG EARTHQUAKE (2009) 
On September 30, 2009 a 7.6 magnitude earthquake of the coast of Sumatra, 
Indonesia. The resulting damage prompted the Indonesian government to request 
assistance from the U.S. government, who subsequently assigned U.S. naval forces to 
provide aid to the local population. Lessons learned from this event highlighted the 
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benefits of airlift assets to assist in delivering supplies and medical personnel to the 
effected population. 
Initial vertical lift shortfalls coupled with limited ground distribution routes 
resulted in the inadequate distribution of relief supplies like water, food, blankets or tarps, 
and medical services (TNI Information Center, 2009). On October 3, the USS Denver 
arrived along with components of the 31st MEU and began providing direct relief 
support. Vertical lift assets from the 31st MEU and the Tactical Air Control Squadron 12 
(TACRON 12) conducted surveys to provide damage assessments of the effected region 
and identify potential landing zones in isolated regions (O’Connor, 2012). 
Their efforts facilitated the prioritization of relief efforts and established a base 
for follow-on air relief operations. Within the first 13 days of U.S. supported relief 
operations, CH-53 helicopters had conducted over 150 sorties to deliver 640,000 pounds 
of supplies, and transported 1,117 personnel for medical treatment (O’Connor, 2012). 
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IV. CAPABILITIES AND RESPONSE 
A. INTRODUCTION TO HA/DR SUPPLY 
Determining the optimal response measures for HA/DR related demand begins by 
identifying the available organic assets and capabilities of the Indonesian Navy and the 
United States Marines Corps. It is important to note that supply capability extends across 
all phases of HA/DR operations and include “procurement, staging, warehousing, and 
managing of inventory to support the disaster response” (Apte & Yoho, 2012, pp. 7–8). 
Figure 5 is an illustration of the application of critical resources during a natural 
disaster. Peak demand is normally experienced at the onset of an event and gradually 
declines as relief operations continue. Overlaps during transitional phases ensure the 
uninterrupted application of relief efforts and is essential to mission success. Our research 
focused on inventory management activities conducted during phase one operations; the 
deployment of necessary personnel, material, logistics and communication assets; and 
capabilities needed to meet critical demand requirements. Critical personnel are defined 
as essential members from both the Indonesian Navy and the United States Marine Corps 
whose military occupation directly supports HA/DR operations. Material assets are listed 
as the supplies and equipment needed to meet medical relief, sustenance, habitat and 
infrastructure requirements. The logistics component encompasses the elements related to 
the coordination and execution required for the distribution of material and the 
transportation of personnel and equipment, while the communication capabilities focus 
on the requirements needed to establish and maintain collaborative networks.  
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Figure 5.   HA/DR Operational Phases and Associated Demand 
 
Adapted from Cecchine et al., “The U.S. Military Response to the 2010 Haiti 
Earthquake—Considerations for Army Leaders,“ RAND, 2013, http://www.rand. 
org/RAND_RR304.pdf. 
Once identified, these four components can be listed and weighted based on their 
ability to support the spectrum of critical demand requirements, as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3.   HA/DR Response Capability Matrix 
 
 
The reference template shown in Table 3 captures and presents quantitative or 
qualitative aspects of supply and demand for a multitude of responders and response 
organizations. Supply criteria is prioritized in descending order based on the criticality of 
the required service. Medical requirements are limited to the assets, which pertained 
directly to life-saving measures required within the first five days of a disaster. 
Sustenance contains the minimal food and water required to prevent the loss of life from 
dehydration and starvation. Habitat includes the necessary shelter and hygienic resources 
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required to prevent the loss of life from exposure to the elements or unsanitary 
conditions.  
B. INDONESIAN NAVY 
The Indonesian Navy (Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Laut [TNI AL]) 
consists of several components including two naval fleets, two Marine Corps groups, and 
a naval air arm. The total strength of TNI AL is around 65,000 personnel and is 
comprised of 44,000 sailors, 20,000 marines, and 1,000 naval airmen. TNI AL has been 
enhancing their capacity and capability in recent years through the procurement of new 
ships, amphibious tanks, anti-submarine warfare helicopters, and maritime patrol aircraft. 
These products are both built locally and imported from allied countries. The mission of 
TNI AL is to protect Indonesia’s vast maritime territory and resources. Additional 
missions conducted by TNI AL include improving their strategic sealift capacity provide 
enhanced response to natural disasters and for the transport of marine and army ground 
forces throughout the region (Jane’s, 2015a). 
In disaster relief operations, TNI AL collaborates as combined forces with the 
Indonesian Air Force (Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Udara [TNI AU]) and the 
Indonesian Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat [TNI AD]). In this 
mission, they use assets owned by each service. All disaster relief operations are 
considered joint endeavors of the Indonesian Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia 
[TNI]) in their support to the Indonesian National Board of Disaster Management (Badan 
Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana [BNPB]). Though their involvement must wait until it 
has been requested by the BNPB, TNI will always be the primary response organization 
in any disaster relief operations.   
Figures 6 and 7 depict the scheme for organizing disaster relief cooperation in 
Indonesia and between Indonesia and foreign countries. These figures were published in 
the Manual of TNI Cooperation with Military of Other Countries in the Field of Disaster 
Relief, 2009. The next section will categorize and define equipment owned by the TNI 
AL and their subordinate forces that can be utilized in the Humanitarian 
Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations. 
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Figure 6.  Military Response to Disasters within Indonesia 
 
Adapted from Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) Commander Regulations, “The manual of 
the Indonesian armed forces cooperation with the military of other countries in the field 
of disaster relief,” 2009. 
Figure 7.  Military Response to Disasters in a Foreign Country 
 
Adapted from Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) Commander Regulations, “The manual of 
the Indonesian armed forces cooperation with the military of other countries in the field 
of disaster relief,” 2009. 
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1. Naval Warships 
TNI AL plays an important role in maintaining security throughout the 
archipelago of Indonesia. The role of TNI AL during wartime is to cooperate with the 
Indonesian Air Force while interdicting potential threats as far forward as possible. This 
deep interdiction is designed to prevent foreign incursion and threatening the population 
center of Indonesia while simultaneously securing the sovereign exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ). In peacetime, TNI AL has a principal responsibility of thwarting illegal fishing, 
smuggling, piracy, and to support domestic operations. These domestic operations 
includes HA/DR support in response to natural disasters. TNI AL has two major fleets 
with tactical commands in Jakarta and Surabaya. The Western Fleet Command in Jakarta 
covers waters that are in the western region of Indonesia encompassing Sumatra Island, 
the Strait of Malacca, islands in Riau, the western part of Java and Borneo Islands. The 
Eastern Fleet Command in Surabaya protects all waters that are in the eastern part of 
Indonesia including the eastern part of Borneo Island, Sulawesi Islands, Nusa Tenggara 
Islands, and islands in Maluku, Papua, and the Arafura Sea. The number of warships 
deployed in the eastern region is much larger than the west as it encompasses a much 
more extensive waterway. The number of ships in the western and eastern fleets in 











Table 4.   Indonesian Naval Ships in Service in the Western and Eastern Fleets 
No. Ship class Unit Helo onboard 
1. Landing Platform Dock (LPD) Hospital ship 1 2 helos 
2. LPD Makassar Class 2 2 helos 
3. LPD Banjarmasin Class 2 3 helos 
4. Landing Ship Tank (LST) Teluk Semangka Class 5 1 helo 
5. LST Teluk Bintuni Class 1 2 helos 
6. LST Frosch Class 11 - 
7. Submarine Cakra Class 2 - 
8. Frigate (FFG) Ahmad Yani Class 6 1 helo 
9. FFG Ki Hajar Dewantara Class 1 1 helo 
10. FFG Bung Tomo Class 3 1 helo 
11. Corvette Diponegoro Class 4 1 helo 
12. Corvette Fatahillah Class 3 1 helo 
13. Corvette Kapitan Patimura Class 14 - 
14. Fast Attack Craft Missile (FACM) Mandau Class 4 - 
15. Fast Attack Craft Torpedo (FACT) Singa Class 2 - 
16. Fast Attack Craft (FAC) Clurit Class 12 - 
17. FACM Sampari Class 3 - 
18. FACM Salawaku Class 2 - 
19. Fast Patrol Boat Missile (FPBM) Todak Class 4 - 
20. FPB Kakap Class 4 1 helo (SAR) 
21. Patrol Craft (PC) 36 13 - 
22. PC Sibarau Class 8 - 
23. PC 40 10 - 
24. PC 43 3 - 
25. Mine-counter Measure Vessel (MCMV) Pulau Rengat Class 2 - 
26. MCMV Condor Class 9 - 
27. Auxiliary 3 Oiler and water 
  
Numbers presented show all helicopters onboard, including warships that can facilitate 
helicopter airlift and transportation. Adapted from Saunders, “Jane’s Fighting Ships 
2014–2015,“ IHS Global Limited, 2015. 
 
The first five warships listed in Table 4 provide a vital role in HA/DR operations. 
Landing Platform Dock (LPD) ships carry up to three helicopters when underway. This 
type of ship also has two Landing Craft Utility’s (LCUs) used as multi-purpose logistics 
vessels. The LCUs can operate at speeds averaging 30 knots. LCUs can also transfer 150 
fully equipped military personnel or 120 personnel and one 5-ton truck. The Landing 
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Ship Tank (LST) has a major role in amphibious operations and is also suitable to carry 
logistics for HA/DR operations because of a spacious hold and storage capacity. The LST 
storage capacity can quickly be converted from its primary mission of transporting 
Indonesia’s main battle tanks to moving up to 650 tons of HA/DR supplies. This type of 
ship is also able to carry two helicopters to increase its ability to support the amphibious 
forces (Saunders, 2015). 
2. Indonesian Marine Corps 
The Indonesian Marine Corps (Korps Marinir [Kormar]) is a subordinate 
component command of the Indonesian Navy. They have two marine groups and one 
infantry brigade. Each marine group includes a brigade of three battalions, a cavalry 
regiment with tank and reconnaissance units, and a combat support regiment with 
engineer, communication, supply, air defense, landing craft, transport and medical units. 
The stand-alone infantry brigade lacks cavalry and combat support units. The Indonesian 
Marine Corps is headquartered in Jakarta. The first group command headquarters is  
based in Sidoarjo (East Java) and covers Indonesia’s eastern region while the second 
group is based in Jakarta and covers Indonesia’s central and western regions. In addition 
to these two groups, the standalone infantry brigade is the initial phase of the 
development of a third group (Jane’s, 2015a). The Indonesian Marine Corps is a major 
player in any HA/DR response by providing ground forces to augment the army. The 
primary type and number of equipment in service with the Indonesian Marine Corps can 








Table 5.   Indonesia Marine Corps Equipment in Service 





d. Water tank 
e. Fuel tank 









Up to 2,000 kg 
2,000 kg–4,500 kg 
4,500 kg–8,000 kg  
Up to 8,000 liters 
Up to 8,000 liters 
Up to 34,000 kg 
2. Trailer 
a. Toilet/restroom portable 
b. Water 







Up to 10,000 liters 
Up to 21,800 kg 
 
3. Heavy Equipment 
a. Dozer 
b. Bulldozer 
c. Hough loader  
d. Crane 
e. Excavator 
f. Road roller 
g. Front loader 
h. Backhoe loader 
i. Loader 
j. Road grader 





























4. Prime Mover 12  
5. Cargo Trailer (40 feet container) 11 Up to 26,680 kg  
6. Ambulance 28  
7. Firefighting 4  
8. Water Canon 2  
9. Workshop 10  
10. Mobile Communication 6  
11. Towing Car 2  
 
Information was initially adapted from Connors & Foss, “Jane’s Military Vehicles and 
Logistics 2005–2006, “ Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2005; Southby & Obe, 
“Jane’s Amphibious and Special Forces, “ 2002, https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu 
CustomPagesJanesDisplayPage.aspxDocType=Reference&ItemId=+++1309125.pdf, and 
then cross-referenced with information from www.marinir.tnial.mil.id (Indonesia Marine 
Corps website), www.dephub.go.id (Indonesia Ministry of Transportation website), and 
additional sources were available. Numbers presented as a maximum load capacity 
obtained from www.hubdat.dephub.go.id (Directorate General of Land Transportation) 
and was also cross-referenced when additional sources were available. Last information 
was adapted from Jane’s Information Group, “Jane’s Land Warfare Platform–Logistics, 




Based on Table 5, the primary issue facing the Indonesian Marine Corps is their 
vehicle readiness. On average, nearly 35% of their vehicles are down for repairs or 
awaiting maintenance parts (M. Isarisnawan, personal communication, June 24, 2015).1 
These maintenance issues stem from an aging equipment set, long lead time for repair 
part acquisition, and a non-standardized mix of vehicles from multiple international 
vendors. The planning policy of TNI AL in 2016 for the task of military operations other 
than war (MOOTW) is to help the government respond to natural disasters, displacement, 
and the distribution of humanitarian aid. In response to this planning policy, the 
Indonesian Marine Corps is modernizing portions of their equipment inventory in 2016. 
The Indonesian Marine Corps purchases in 2016 are shown in Table 6. 
Table 6.    Indonesian Marine Corps Equipment Purchases 
No. Equipment Unit Maximum load 
1. Medium Forklift 2 2.5 tons 
2. Heavy Forklift 2 5 tons 
3. Excavator 2  
4. Loader 1  
5. Road grader 2  
6. Fuel-tank truck 4 8,000 liters 
7. Water-tank truck 4 8,000 liters 
8. Hyperbaric chamber 1  
9. Ambulance car 3  
10. Crane truck 13  
11. Firefighting vehicle 2  
12. Bulldozer 2  
13. Field hospital 1  
14. Remotely Operated Underwater 
Vehicle (ROV) 
1  
15. Reverse Osmosis (RO) 10  
 
Adapted from Indonesian Navy (TNI AL), “Decisions of the Chief of Navy 
Staff,“ Planning Policy 2016, March 9, 2015.  
 
 
                                                 
1 This information was conveyed to the authors through voice and electronic communication during 
our research, summer quarter, Naval Postgraduate School. 
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Table 6 is a reflection of the FY16 planned purchases for the Indonesian Marine 
Corps. The purpose of this purchase plan is to leverage the capacity of equipment 
especially for conducting Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) in HA/DR 
operations. The Indonesian Marine Corps also faces a big challenge in procurement 
process regarding overlapping tasks with the Indonesian Army. Another challenge 
encountered by the Indonesian Marine Corps particularly and TNI AL generally is the 
vast area of responsibility to cover all Indonesian waters.  
3. Indonesian Naval Air Component 
The TNI AL flight element consists of six components. These components are 
separated into their core mission capabilities and include: 
 100 Air Squadron, Anti-Submarine Warfare 
 200 Air Squadron, Training 
 400 Air Squadron, Search and Rescue (SAR) 
 600 Air Squadron, Transport and Utility 
 800 Air Squadron, Maritime Patrol Aircraft 
 900 Air Squadron, Repair and Maintenance (Hunter, 2014) 
The first component is 100 Air Squadron that has a main duty to conduct Anti-
Submarine Warfare (ASW). This unit re-established in 2014 in conjunction with the 
purchase of the AS-565 Panther anti-submarine helicopter. The decision to re-establish 
the 100 Air Squadron arose due to the recent proliferation of submarines in Southeast 
Asian waters. At least ten new submarines have been delivered to regional countries, 
including Singapore and Malaysia. The increased potential of submarine threats created 
the need to dedicate this naval aviation squadron with specific training and capabilities in 
submarine action (Rahmat, 2015). This unit was first formed in July 1961 as a dedicated 
fixed-wing aircraft ASW and underwent liquidation in the wake an economic crisis 
affecting Indonesia in 1998.   
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The 200 Air Squadron service is designed to recruit and train TNI AL pilots for 
fixed and rotary wing. The 400 Air Squadron is a combat team whose primary mission is 
Search and Rescue (SAR). The major function of the 600 Air Squadron is as an airlift 
element conducting general transportation and utility. The 800 Air Squadron serves as the 
leading component of maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) conducting interoperability 
operations between air and surface assets. Lastly, the 900 Air Squadron is the primary 
location of all aircraft maintenance and repair (skuadron600.blogspot.com, 2012). The 
total number of aircraft in service is summarized by Table 7: 
Table 7.   Indonesian Naval Aircraft In Service 
No. Aircraft type Inventory Remarks 
1. TB-9 Tampico 4 Basic Prop Trainer 
2. TB-10 Tobago 5 Basic Prop Trainer 
3. N-22/N-24 Nomad 25 Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) 
4. NC-212 Aviocar Casa 8 Aircraft Transport and MPA 
5. NC-235 AirTech Casa 5 Aircraft Transport and MPA 
6. NBO-105CB Bolcow 6 Helo Transport, Search and Rescue 
(SAR) 
7. EC-120B Colibri 3 Helo Trainer 
8. NAS-332 L1 Super 
Puma 
3 Utility 
9. NBell-412 Bell 6 Helo Transport & SAR 
10. AS-565 MBe Panther 11 Helo Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) 
 
Adapted from Hunter, J. (Ed.), “Jane’s all the World’s Aircraft—In Service 2014–2015,” 
HIS Global Limited, 2014. 
 
The Indonesian Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia [TNI]) is seeking to 
set aside funds from the 2016 defense budget to procure four Boeing CH-47 Chinook 
heavy-lift helicopters for future procurement. This program has been confirmed by the 
TNI Commander and was announced in June 2015. Indonesia requires these Chinooks to 
boost the limited heavy-lift rotary-wing capabilities for their land and marine forces. The 
TNI has maintained this requirement to purchase the platform for several years, but 
budgetary constraints have precluded the purchase up to this point. The TNI’s proposal to 
secure funding for the Chinook acquisition from the 2016 fiscal year defense budget is 
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possible at the acquisition cost of approximately $30 million dollars per unit. If acquired, 
the Chinook will be utilized primarily in disaster-relief operations (Grevatt, 2015). 
C. UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS 
1. Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) 
The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) serves as the USMC 
organizational base, providing structure for the Marine Corps mission execution 
throughout the entire range of military operations.  The MAGTF will “consist of four 
core elements – a command element, a ground combat element (GCE), an aviation 
combat element (ACE), and a logistics combat element (LCE)” (MCDP 1-0, 2011, p. 2-
6). A notional MEU or MEU Special Operations Capable organizational structure is 
shown in Table 8. This organization table shows a commander what forces are available. 
This structure is also capable of conducting disaggregated operations throughout a full 
range of military operations to include HA/DR (USMC, 2009). 
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Table 8.   Notional MEU Structure and Organization 
 
Source United States Marine Corps (USMC), “Policy for Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) and 
expeditionary units (special operations capable) MEU (SOC) (MCO 3120.9C),“ 2009, 
http://www.marines.mil/News/Publications/ 
ELECTRONICLIBRARY/ElectronicLibraryDisplay/tabid/13082/Article/126201/mco-31209c-final.aspx. 












command and control is 
provided by the Command 
Element
The GCE is structured around 
a reinforced infantry battalion
The ACE is a 
composite/reinforced 
squadron structured around 
Medium Lift or Tilt-Rotor 
Squadron
The LCE is structured 
around Combat Logistic 
Battalion (CLB) provides the 
following
The MSOC is a special 
operations force partnered 




personnel: USMC: 25 OFF 
and 140 ENL, USN: 1 OFF 
and 3 ENL
Approximately 1200 
personnel: USMC: 59 OFF 
and 1086 ENL, USN: 3 OFF 
and 50 ENL
Approximately 417 
personnel: USMC: 75 OFF 
and 337 ENL, USN: 1 OFF 
and 4 ENL
Approximately 273 
personnel: USMC: 14 OFF 
and 232 ENL, USN: 6 OFF 
and 21 ENL
Approximately 84 personnel: 






H&S Company Medium Lift or Tilt-Rotor 
Squadron
Headquarters and Service 
Platoon
Company HQ
Imagery Interpretation Det Rifle Company x 3 Heavy Helicopter Squadron 
Det
Communications Platoon Marine Special Operations 
Teams (MSOT) x 3
Human Exploitation Team Weapons Company Light/Attack Helicopter 
Squadron Det
Maintenance Platoon
Enablers: Admin, EOD, 
Riggers, Maintenance, 
Supply, Ammo Techs, Fire 
Control Team, Embark
Ground Sensor Det Tank Platoon Marine Attack Squadron 
Det
Supply Platoon  
Topographic Det Artillery Battery Marine Fighter / Attack 
Squadron Det (Tethered)
Transportation Support 
Platoon (Includes Landing 
Support & Motor 
Transpotation)
 
Radio Battalion Det LAR Platoon/Company Marine Aerial Refueler / 
Transport Squadron Det
Health Services Platoon  
Communications Battalion 
Det
Shore Fire Control Party Marine Air Control Group 
Det
Engineer Platoon  
Force Reconnaissance 
Platoon
Combat Engineer Platoon Marine Wing Support 
Squadron Det
  
Military Police Squad Division Reconnaissance 
Platoon
Marine Aviation Logistics 
Squadron Det
  
 Assault Amphibian Vehicle 
Platoon
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These components provide the Marine Corps a self-sufficient, sustainable means 
to project military power while maintaining a scalable expeditionary posture. MAGTFs 
are categorized into four type based on size and duration of self-sustainment. The Marine 
Expeditionary Force (MEF) is the largest and most complex type of MAGTF. It is 
comprised of over 40,000 personnel who can provide up to 60 days of internally 
supported operational combat capabilities, while the Marine Expeditionary Brigade 
(MEB) is structured to support over 16,000 personnel over a 30-day period (MCDP 1-0, 
2011). The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is the smallest and most responsive type of 
MAGTF and normally consists of an infantry battalion combat logistics battalion and a 
composite Marine aircraft squadron. Its organic structure can provide up to 15 days of 
sustainment in austere conditions for approximately 2000 personnel (MCDP 1-0, 2011). 
Special Purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF) is constructed to serve specific mission 
requirements and is tasked organized to augment the capabilities of existing 
expeditionary forces (MCDP 1-0, 2011).   
The mission of a MEU is to “provide a forward deployed, flexible sea-based 
Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) capable of conducting Amphibious 
Operations, crisis response and limited contingency operations, to include enabling the 
introduction of follow on forces, and, designated special operations, in order to support  
the theater requirements of Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC)” (USMC, 2009).  
The MEU’s core elements provide the flexibility required to support a variety of 
military operations. The organic equipment associated to each core component provides 








Table 9.   MEU Baseline Equipment Requirements 
 
Adapted from United States Marine Corps (USMC), “Policy for Marine Expeditionary 
Units (MEU) and expeditionary units (special operations capable) MEU (SOC) (MCO 
3120.9C),” 2009, http://www.marines.mil/News/Publications/ELECTRONICLIBRARY/ 
ElectronicLibraryDisplay/tabid/13082/Article/126201/mco-31209c-final.aspx. 
 
2. The Maritime Pre-positioning Force (MPF) 
The MPF is a strategically positioned material support asset that provides enough 
supplies and combat equipment to support a MEB for 30 days. Each MPF contains a 
maritime pre-positioning ships squadron (MPSRON), Navy support element and a 
MAGTF fly-in echelon (MCDP 1–0, 2011). MPSRON-3 is located in the Guam/Saipan 
area is capable of reaching the any point in Southeast-Asia within 3 days. MPF 
Enhancement (MPF-E) capabilities include a Navy Mobile Construction Battalion 
(NMCB) this provides engineering, and construction support, along with Expeditionary 
Medical Facilities (EMF) which supports level III medical care (HQMC, 2009). 
Collectively, these three components are capable of providing a large portion of the 
critical supplies and equipment during HA/DR operations.    
(1) MEWSS LAV (7) LAVs (12) CH-46E/MV-22B (2) TWPS (16) HMMWVs
(18) HMMWVs (15) AAVs/EFVs (4) CH-53E (5) Refuelers (4) Trailers
(1) JTF Enabler (4) Tanks *** (4) AH-1W (1) M88A1
(6) CRRCs* (6) M777A2 (3) UH-1N/Y (15) MTVRs
(20) CRRCs** (6) AV-8B (18) HMMWVs
(2) ACEs (5) A-MANPADS (1) AAVR7
(16) MTVRs (5) HMMWVs (1) 5k Forklift
(8) 81 MMs (2) KC-130 (1) EBFL Forklift
(8) TOW Launchers (6) F/A-18 ***** (1) D-7
(64) HMMWVs (1) Excavator
(7) IFAVs (2) TRAM Forklift













31st MEU does not embark.
The EFSS (120mm mortar) may be employed in place of the M777, in conjunction with the
M777 (reduced numbers for both), or not at all.




Marine Special Operations Company
CONUS deploying MEUs embark (6) CRRCs.
31st MEU embark (20) CRRCs.
CE BLT ACE LCE MSOC
Command Element
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D. USMC DISASTER RESPONSE 
Each MEU is loaded to a baseline in accordance with the equipment and 
personnel designated in Tables 8 and 9. Even with this baseline, many external factors 
can influence the HA/DR response provided by the Marine Corps. In order to further 
understand the supply most likely provided by the USMC in a HA/DR scenario, we 
analyzed the USMC response to two recent disasters. The disasters chosen took place 
within the last five years, span developed and underdeveloped countries and involved a 
significant response from the Marine Corps MEU. A comparison between the 2010 Haiti 
Earthquake, 2011 Japan Earthquake and Tsunami and the 2015 Nepal Earthquake is 
shown in Table 10.   
1. Operation Unified Response (2010 Haiti Earthquake) 
On Tuesday, January 12, 2010, an earthquake registering magnitude 7.0 on the 
Richter scale struck approximately 15 miles WSW of Port-Au-Prince Haiti (USGS, 
2010). The earthquake epicenter near Haiti’s capital, the most populous portion of the 
island, is shown in Figure 8.   
Already considered a fragile state due to years of political upheaval, military 
coups, and frequent natural disasters, the devastation caused by this earthquake was 
tremendous. According to 2013 RAND report titled The U.S. Military Response to the 
2010 Haiti Earthquake over 316,000 people were killed, 300,000 injured and over 
1,000,000 persons were displaced. In addition to this tremendous loss of human life, over 
100,000 structures were destroyed with twice that number significantly damaged. 
Included in these numbers, the presidential palace and 14 of the 16 government ministry 
buildings were destroyed and many of the associated government officials working in 
these buildings were killed. All major sea and air ports were also incapacitated by the 
earthquake and would have to be reopened before any material or persons could flow in 




Figure 8.  Map of Haiti Earthquake Epicenter 
 
Source United States Agency for International Development (USAID), “Haiti Earthquake 
Intensity Map,” 2010, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADR213.pdf. 
Immediately following the earthquake, the President of Haiti sent a messenger to 
the U.S. ambassador requesting assistance. Built from this request, Operation Unified 
Response became the rest of the world’s response to the disaster, including the United 
States of America “whole-government” response and the creation of Joint Task Force 
Haiti (JTF-Haiti). The Department of Defense assigned SOUTHCOM to be the lead 
element responsible for the coordination of HA/DR support. The 22nd and 24th MEUs 
were retasked in order to comprise the Marine Corps response elements. The mission of 
JTF-Haiti was stated as follows: 
JTF-Haiti conducts humanitarian assistance/foreign disaster response 
operations in support of USAID in Haiti to save lives, mitigate near-term 
human suffering and accelerate relief efforts to facilitate transition to 
GoH, UN, and USAID. (Cecchine et al., 2013, p. 32) 
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The first U.S. troops arrived in Haiti hours post-earthquake. U.S. Air Force 
Special Operations teams arrived and were tasked to reopen Toussaint Louverture 
International Airport (SOUTHCOM, 2010). The first Marine Corps units arrived in Haiti 
on January 18, with the USS Bataan Amphibious Group. This included members of the 
22nd MEU and encompassed more than 2,200 Marines (Global Security, 2010). The 
intent of these troop deployments was to quickly stabilize the region and then turn the 
bulk of the HA/DR response back over to host government agencies, NGOs and the 
United Nations as quickly as possible. By the end of the response, the Marine Corps had 
deployed the 24th MEU embarked aboard the USS Nassau (LHA 4) Amphibious Ready 
Group, and the 22nd MEU embarked aboard the USS Bataan (LHD 5) Amphibious 
Ready Group (Margesson & Taft-Morales, 2010). 
Operation Unified Response provided several challenges to the responding 
Marine Corps Units. In addition to the tremendous loss of life from the earthquake, 
severe damage was inflicted upon Haiti’s infrastructure. According to a Post-Disaster 
Needs Assessment (PDNA) jointly published by the Government of Haiti and 
international partners, even before the earthquake there had been logistics transportation 
shortfalls. The PDNA stated, “with 3,400 km of roads, 800 km of them paved, the road 
network was very limited. The port and air infrastructures were in no position to act as a 
platform for economic growth” (Government of Haiti, 2010). The earthquake destroyed 
almost 8.75% of the paved roads, with much of this destruction on the heavily used 
routes between the ports and the capital city. The lack of trafficable roads led to issues 
with military vehicle movement and the reliance on helicopter transport. 
The 22nd and 24th MEU assigned to support Operation Unified Response had 
vehicles that were capable of transporting necessary equipment and supplies over a 
broken or limited roadway. The Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) is 
designed to traverse a 60% gradient and 30% side slope with its maximum cross-country 
load of up to seven tons of supplies (Oshkosh Defense, 2015). The two MEUs, with an 
augment from the MPF fleet, had just over 40 MTVRs available for use. Unfortunately, 
with the main roads severely damaged, the urban environment was too restrictive to 
utilize the MTVRs where they were most needed. Instead, the smaller High Mobility 
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Multi-Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) were used—diminishing the per vehicle cargo 
capacity from 14,000 pounds to around five hundred pounds.   
With diminished ground transportation availability, the MEU relied on airlift 
capability for many distribution and recovery operations. Unfortunately, the same tightly 
packed and poorly constructed buildings that limited the MTVR movements also 
diminished the number of available landing zones. LTG Keen, the Deputy Commander of 
U.S. Southern Command, said that “the use of helicopters in the congested areas where 
most of the Haitian people are in need, you’re not going to be landing helicopters in those 
areas–we have to pick sites as close as we can”  (Raddatz & Ayala, 2010).  In addition to 
the inability to access the highly populated urban areas by air or ground, the temporary 
shelter facilities erected on the outskirts of the capital city also posed access issues. The 
rotor wash from the large cargo helicopters and tilt-rotor aircraft assigned to the MEU 
destroyed shelters and created hazardous flying debris. These concerns forced the 
relocation of the airborne deliveries to more remote landing zones and minimized the 
effectiveness of their use.    
In total, more than 10,000 Sailors and Marines participated in Operation Unified 
Response.  17 ships, 48 helicopters and 12 fixed-wing aircraft were used to deliver relief 
supplies and to evacuate U.S. citizens and Haitians needing medical treatment (U.S. 
Navy, U.S. Fleet Forces Public Affairs, 2010). The 22nd MEU independently delivered: 
 560,000 liters of bottled water,  
 195,000 gallons of bulk water, 
 1.6 million pounds of rations,  
 15,000 pounds of medical supplies, and  
 618 flight missions flown to provide direct support to the Haitian 




2. Operation Tomodachi (2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and 
Tsunami) 
On Friday March 11, 2011, at 2:46 local time, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck 
off the East coast of Honshu, Japan (USGS, 2011). The earthquake caused widespread 
damage itself, while the tsunami it created had devastating onshore results due to the 
offshore earthquake epicenter and the narrow inlets leading to dense population centers. 
The epicenter of the earthquake and the widespread devastation caused by the 
earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear reactor fallout is shown in Figure 9.  
Figure 9.  Earthquake Epicenter in Japan 
 
Source United States Agency for International Development (USAID), “USG 
Humanitarian Assistance to Japan for the Earthquake and Tsunami,” 2011. 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pa00j43c.pdf. 
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Waves estimated to have reached over 35 meters caused the displacement of more 
than 470,000 people, the confirmed death of 15,889 people, injury of 6,152 more, and as 
of November 2014, 2,597 people remained officially missing (IFRC, 2015). In addition to 
the immediate loss of life and damage caused by the earthquake and tsunami, the 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power plant suffered a total loss of power to the active 
cooling systems. The damages led to several large explosions and the massive release of 
radioactive material—reaching a level 7 (the highest level) on the International Nuclear 
Event Scale (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2011). 
In the immediate wake of the combined disasters, the Government of Japan (GoJ) 
requested HA/DR assistance from the United States. Operation Tomodachi (translated to 
“friend(s)” in Japanese) was the moniker given to the United States DOD response to the 
disasters. Immediately upon the receipt of the request for assistance, the USMC response 
began with surveillance provided by CH-46E helicopters from Marine Medium 
Helicopter Squadron 265, III MEF, as they traversed from Marine Corps Air Station 
Futenma to the U.S. Naval Air Facility Atsugi located on Honshu (Zielonka, Miller, & 
Walton, 2011). 
Throughout Operation Tomodachi, the USMC involved over 3,600 Marines and 
Sailors in the repose effort. The preponderance of these members came from land bases 
on Okinawa and Mainland Japan, and from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit that had 
been conducting operations in Indonesia and Malaysia. Additional specialties to include 
Assessment and Consequence Teams (ACTs) and Chemical Biological Incident 
Response Forces (CBIRFs) were flown in from the United States (USMC, 2011b). 
The scope of this disaster coupled with the long standing bilateral involvement 
with Japan made this a unique HA/DR response for the Marines. Located in the southern 
hemisphere when the Japanese earthquake struck, it took the 31st MEU just over 10 days 
to reform, reload and steam north to assist in the assistance operations. Upon their arrival, 
the MEU was utilized to reach outlying islands that had been cut off from their mainland 
sources of supply from the loss of bridges, pipelines and port infrastructure (Marine 
Corps Association and Foundation [MCAF], 2011). The primary sources of ship to shore 
transportation were the two Landing Craft Air-Cushioned and two Landing Craft 
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Utilities. Capable of hauling a combined tonnage of over 460 tons (170 tons per LCU and 
60 tons per LCAC) (Global Security, 2011, 2012) per trip, the landing craft ferried 
medical supplies, potable water, food, comfort items, and military and Japanese civilian 
power generation equipment and mechanics to areas that had been unreachable until the 
MEUs arrival (MCAF, 2011). 
The significant potential for radiation exposure throughout Operation Tomodachi 
brought a small but important military occupational specialty to the forefront of the 
HA/DR mission. The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Marines were 
utilized to monitor air, ground and water samples throughout the MEU response. The 
radiation threat also required that the CBRN Marines erected and manned 
decontamination sites in the event personnel or equipment were contaminated (USMC, 
2011b).   
3. Nepal Earthquake (2015) 
During the process of conducting research for this project, a 7.8 magnitude 
earthquake struck central Nepal on April 25, 2015, causing widespread devastation 
(USGS, 2015). The location of this event (over 450 miles from the nearest coastline) 
made the USMC reaction much different from other cases that we studied. However, 
important lessons are being learned for USMC response in future HA/DR scenarios.     
On May 3, 2015, the first USMC equipment and personnel to arrive in Nepal 
came in the form of tilt and rotor-wing aircraft to include (4) MV-22s and (3) UH-1N 
Hueys. The primary purpose of these assets was to assist in the delivery of critical aid 
items to civilians isolated by the earthquakes. Food, water and tarps designed for 
temporary shelters were the main items requiring transport (Marine Corps Times, 2015a). 
Tragically, on  May 12, while delivering supplies, one Huey crashed and all six Marines 
and three additional persons onboard were killed in the accident (Marine Corps Times, 
2015b). 
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4. USMC Disaster Supply Summary 
Each disaster presents a wide-ranging set of problems, issues and potential 
solutions. A snapshot of the three disasters covered in the previous section is shown in 
Table 10 in order to highlight these variances. 








Tuesday, January 12, 
2010 





21:53:10 UTC /  
04:53:10 PM Local 
05:46:24 UTC /  
02:46:24 PM Local 





25 km (15 miles) 
WSW of PORT-AU-
PRINCE, Haiti 
129 km (80 miles) E 
of Sendai, Honshu, 
Japan 





Magnitude 7.0 9.0 7.8 
Persons Killed 316,000 15,889 8,898 
Persons Injured 300,000 6,152 22,309 
Persons Missing  2,597  
Persons Displaced 1,000,000 470,000 2,800,000 
Structures 
Destroyed 100,000 45,700 602,000 
Structures 
Damaged 200,000 144,300 285,000 
Adapted from: 
1. Cecchine et al., “The U.S. Military response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake—
Considerations for Army leaders,” 2013, http://www.rand.org/RAND_RR304.pdf.; and 
then cross-referenced with United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (UNCHOA), “Nepal Earthquake,” 2015, http://www.unocha.org/nepal. 
2. IFRC, “Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (GJET),” 4 year anniversary [Facts 
and figures], 2015, http://www.jrc.or.jp/eq-japan2011/operations-update/pdf/ 
Japan%20GEJET%204%20year%20facts%20and%20figures%28For%20HP%29.pdf. 





In each of the MEU HA/DR responses that we researched, the initial readiness 
and availability of MEU equipment and personnel were similarly trained and prepared to 
support the HA/DR event. The differences in location, accessibility and post-disaster 
needs led to the distinct and diverse responses. Though the responses differed, a 
generalization can still be made regarding the response and capability potential that a 









A. NOTIONAL SCENARIO 
The 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake serves as our basis to analyze the response 
capability of the combined efforts between the USMC MEU and the Indonesian Navy. 
This event provides an ideal analytical source due to the high probability of reoccurrence 
of such an event in the South Pacific, and the extensive amount of demand data captured 
by response organizations. Our analysis of historical data revealed that the majority of 
seismic events recorded within our area of interest measure near 7.5 in magnitude (EM-
DAT, 2012). The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
began recording personnel, logistic and material data for medial, sustenance and habitat 
demand requirements for the 24 hours after the onset of the earthquake. The lack of 
collected data pertaining to infrastructure and communication requirements promoted our 
group to express these requirements as capability thresholds instead of anticipated 
demand. The relative uniformity of data collected within these categories allowed us to 
identify initial critical needs throughout the various stages of response operations and 
created the scenario shown in Table 11. 
B. CAPABILITIES 
Our analysis of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Laut (TNI AL) and the 
Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) capabilities focus on Medical, Sustenance, Habitat 
and Infrastructure categories of demand. The basic method utilized to evaluate the 
capabilities of TNI AL and the USMC MEU through the comparison of the expected 
demand derived from the notional scenario compared to the potential supply is shown in 
Table 12. The remaining gap between supply and demand highlights areas that can be 




Table 11.    Notional Scenario Demand 
Indonesian Navy regional response time: 0 hrs 
USMC MEU regional response time:  ~72 hrs 
Earthquake Magnitude 7.5 
Persons Killed 2500 
Persons Injured 150,000 (22,000 critically)  
Persons Missing 1,500 
Persons Displaced 150,000 
Critical Infrastructure Damage 20,000 
Structures Damaged 80,000 
 
The ideograms listed below serve as graphical representations of capability data 
related to Table 11, Notional Scenario Demand and in addition to Table 3, HA/DR 
Response Capability Matrix. 
 Full Circle  (Sufficient capability): Meets 80% of the expected 
demand for personnel, material, logistics support and communication 
needs during phases 1 and 2 of the depicted scenario.   
 Half-filled Circle  (Insufficient capability): Meets 40–79% of the 
expected demand for personnel, material, logistics support and 
communication needs during phases 1 and 2 of the depicted scenario.   
 Empty Circle  (Capability nonexistent): Meets 39% or less of 
expected demand for personnel, material, logistics support and 
communication needs during phases 1 and 2 of the depicted scenario.   
















Δ Demand Shortfall (Gap) 
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We will focus our analysis through the utilization of our capability matrix (shown 
in Table 3) and the categories of medical, sustenance, habitat and infrastructure. We will 
investigate the capabilities of the available personnel, material, logistics and 
communication assets that fall under each category. This analysis will produce a final 
matrix that can be used to develop remedial courses of action. 
1. Medical 
TNI AL has a hospital ship that would provide the initial response to the scenario 
disaster. This hospital ship has 16 physicians and 55 physician assistants and paramedics. 
This Indonesian hospital ship has 40 ward beds (Indonesian Navy, 2009), while TNI AL 
has the capacity to see approximately 570 patients per day (TNI Information Center, 
2006, 2009). The MEU has two physicians, two physician assistants and 78 corpsmen 
(HQMC, 2015). These troops are organized into a Shock Trauma Platoon (STP) that is 
capable of conducting emergency treatment and triage. The remaining corpsmen are 
dispersed throughout the individual sub-units of the MEU and can provide localized 
treatment in the area affected by the disaster. The MEU also has the capacity to 
temporarily house 30 individuals in an evacuation ward while they await movement to a 
higher level of care on the ARG or at local medical facility. Afloat, the ARG has seven 
physicians and three dentists capable of providing critical emergency treatment and care 
for patients that have been evacuated from the shore to the ships of the ARG (HQMC, 
2015). The MEU and the ARG are capable of treating up to 1,000 patients. TNI AL and 















Physician 16 2 7
Dentist 0 0 3
Physician Assistant 55 2 0
Corpsmen 0 78 8
Ward Beds 40 30* 730-800
Patient Capacity/Day 570 100** 350 1020 
Total Capacity
 
* Temporary evacuation ward beds 
** Maximum of 50 consultations per worker per day 
Adapted from: 
1. Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) Information Center, 880 pasien korban gempa Padang 
dirawat di rumah sakit terapung KRI Dr. Suharso-990 (880 patients Padang earthquake 
victims hospitalized in the hospital ship KRI Dr. Suharso-990),” October 13, 2009, 
http://www.tni.mil.id/view-16035-880-pasien-korban-gempa-padang-dirawat-di-rumkit-
terapung-kri-dr-suharso.html. 
2. United States Marine Corps, Headquarters Marine Corps, “Amphibious Ready Group 
(ARG) and Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Overview,” 2015, http://www.hqmc. 
marines.mil/Portals/61/Docs/Amphibious_Capability.pdf.; and then cross-referenced 




If a medical patient needs to be evacuated to a higher level of care, the Indonesian 
navy has three dedicated ambulances and one medical evacuation helicopter (TNI 
Information Center, 2006, 2009). The MEU has three dedicated HMMWV ambulances 
and 16 Medium and Heavy lift helicopters (MV-22 and CH-53) that can be utilized to 
transport medical patients to the ARG or to regional medical facilities as shown in Table 
14 (Thirty-First Marine Expeditionary Group [31st MEU], 2005). Both the MV-22 and 
the CH-53 can lift 24 combat equipped Marines while the CH-53 can transport 55 













Adapted from:  
1. Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) Information Center, “30 KRI dikerahkan ke Aceh (30 
Indonesian navy warships deployed to Aceh),” February 22, 2005e, http://tni.mil.id/view-
814-kri-teluk-ratai-angkut-bantuan-ke-aceh.html. 
2. Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) Information Center, “6,173 personnel TNI dikerahkan 
ke Aceh (6,173 naval personnel deployed to Aceh), “February 2, 2005d, http://tni.mil. 
id/view-754-6173-personel-tni-dikerahkan-ke-aceh.html. 
3. United States Marine Corps, Headquarters Marine Corps, “Amphibious Ready Group 




Beyond the immediate need of medical services and support, the requirement for 
basic sustenance can quickly become an emergency request in a HA/DR situation. The 
Indonesian Navy can provide field mess feeding for up to 10,000 evacuees per day for 
two meals. In addition to these people receiving food, TNI AL has 4,500 Meals-Ready-
to-EAT (MREs), 120 tons of rice, and 25,233 gallons of bottled water that can be 
distributed for those that cannot be served at the field mess (TNI Information Center 
2005b). The MEU has 45,000 MREs available, can provide field mess feeding for up to 
4,500 people per day (two meals per day) and can produce 24,000 gallons of potable 
water ashore. The ARG can augment this potable water production and can produce 
332,000 gallons of purified water at sea (HQMC, 2015). The Organization for Economic 
Coordination and Development (OECD) published consumption requirement for basic 
survival needs in their Guidance for the Evaluation of Humanitarian Assistance in 
Complex Emergencies. They proposed a range of 7.5–15 liters (2–4 gallons) of water to 
be required per day, per person (OECD, 1999). For this analysis we have averaged this 
range of numbers to requirements for three gallons of potable water and two meals per 
day. The figures and provisions provided by TNI AL and the MEU during both surge and 




Table 15.   TNI AL and MEU Sustenance Capacities (by Type Available)* 
 
* All water quantities are given in gallons and food requirements are MRE individual units and in persons fed per day for Field Mess feeding. 
Adapted from: 
1. Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) Information Center, “Jajaran TNI AL bantu Aceh secara total (TNI AL helped Aceh totally),” January 20, 
2005b, http://www.tni.mil.id/ view-738-pangarmabar-jajaran-tni-al-bantu-aceh-secara-total.html. 
2. United States Marine Corps, Headquarters Marine Corps, “Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) 




Table 16.   TNI AL and MEU Sustenance  
(Surge and Sustained Capacities* 
 
* All water quantities are given in gallons and food requirements are given in persons fed 
per day. Adapted from United States Marine Corps, Headquarters Marine Corps, 
“Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Overview,” 
2015, http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/61/Docs/Amphibious_Capability.pdf, and 
Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) Information Center, “Jajaran TNI AL bantu Aceh secara 
total (TNI AL helped Aceh totally),” January 20, 2005b, http://www.tni.mil.id/view-738-
pangarmabar-jajaran-tni-al-bantu-aceh-secara-total.html. 
3. Habitat 
With the frequency of large-scale disasters taking place in Indonesia, local aid 
organizations have prepositioned nearly 12,000 shelters capable of housing up to 60,000 
displaced people (TNI Information Center, 2005e). The Indonesian Navy has 40 field 
tents and 1,000 family tents embarked upon the responding LPD. Each field tent can 
house 45 people while the family tents can hold 5 people. The total shelter provided by 
TNI AL is approximately 6,800 people (TNI Information Center, 2005e). The MEU 
carries 25 General Purpose (GP) tents which can house up to 20 people (Tentnet.org, 
2015). This gives the MEU the ability to provide shelter to approximately 525 people 
(31st MEU, 2005). Taken as a total, approximately 67,325 people can be provided shelter 








Table 17.   TNI AL and MEU Shelter Capacity 
Number of Personnel Sheltered  
NGO 60,000 
TNI AL1 6800 
USMC MEU2 525 
Total  67,325 
 
Adapted from: 
1. Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) Information Center, “30 KRI dikerahkan ke Aceh (30 
Indonesian navy warships deployed to Aceh),” February 22, 2015, http://tni.mil.id/view-
814-kri-teluk-ratai-angkut-bantuan-ke-aceh.html. 
2. Thirty-First Marine Expeditionary Group (31ST MEU) and Commander Amphibious 
Squadron 11 (CPR 11) briefing, “31ST MEU / CPR 11 Humanitarian Assistance Disaster 








We were unable to find suitable data to conduct an analysis for the potential 
damage to infrastructure and the ability for repair. The dynamic response environment 
and unknown outcome of any given HA/DR scenario precluded our ability to pinpoint a 
daily consumption rate of material or the vehicle and personnel requirements. 
Infrastructure repair is an important function in HA/DR response and can assist in the 
distribution of critical supplies. Both TNI AL and the MEU have limited capabilities to 
conduct these operations. According to the TNI Information Center (2005c, 2005d), 
unless otherwise noted, the equipment from the Indonesian Navy includes: 
 2 Excavators (24 tons each) 
 1 Road Grader (14 tons) 
 1 Crane Truck (between 25 and 60 tons) 
 1 Front-End Loader 
 1 Bulldozer 
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 1 Dump Truck (M. Isarisnawan, personal communication, August 14, 
2015)2 
 8,000 45kg sacks of cement 
 223 m3 of wood, and  
 500 pieces of zinc roofing (TNI Information Center, 2005c, 2005d) 
The USMC MEU has the following equipment that can be utilized for 
infrastructure development and repair:   
 3 Bulldozers  
 1 Excavator 
 3 Forklifts  (HQMC, 2015) 
Additionally, the MEU CLB engineering platoon can provide the following:  
 Mobile power generation 
 Village water cistern reinforcement 
 Limited vertical building 
 Roof replacement, and 
 Debris removal (HQMC, 2015) 
 
5. Logistics 
The Marine Corps recognizes six separate functions of logistics to include Supply, 
Maintenance, Transportation, General Engineering, Health Services and General Services 
(MCWP 4-11, 2000). With Health Services representing a large portion of HA/DR 
response, this section has been broken out of the logistics section and given its own 
category for this analysis. Additionally, many logistics functions overlap with the 
sustenance category. This section will identify the remaining logistics material utilized by 
TNI AL and the USMC MEU in support of HA/DR operations.     
                                                 
2 This information was conveyed to the authors through voice and electronic communication during 
our research, summer quarter, Naval Postgraduate School. 
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TNI AL primarily conducts its own organic logistics, and has the following 
equipment available for utilization in HA/DR scenarios:   
 2 LCUs 
 14 Trucks (eight ton max load per truck, 112 ton total hauling capacity) 
 1 firefighting vehicle (5,000 liters of water) (TNI Commander 
Regulations, 2007) 
The MEU has the Logistics Combat Element (LCE) comprised of around 273 
Marines and Sailors assigned to the Combat Logistics Battalion (CLB) (HQMC, 2015). 
The CLB is subdivided into Headquarters Platoon, Law Enforcement Detachment, 
Maintenance Detachment, Medical Detachment, Engineer Platoon, Communications 
Platoon, and Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) Detachment, Supply Detachment and 
Landing Support Platoon (HQMC, 2015). These sections provide the bulk of the logistics 
power of the MEU and can be augmented from the Ground Combat Element or Air 
Combat Element of the MEU to support HA/DR operations. The USMC states that a 
MEU and associated ARG can provide the following logistics equipment: 
 4–7 LCAC and LCUs 
 46 MTVR (seven ton hauling capacity per truck, 322 ton total hauling 
capacity) 
 123 HMMWVs  
 2 Wreckers 
 3 bulldozers  
 3 forklifts 
 4 bulk fuel trucks (5,000 gal of fuel on each truck for a total of 20,000 gal 
of fuel) 
 2 water trucks (1,800 gal of water per truck for a total of 3,600 gal of 
water) 
 2–5 water purification systems (advertised water production of 24,000 
gal/day) 
 5,400 gal mobile–distribution/storage 
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 30,000 gal static–storage 
 1 tank recovery asset 
 1 recovery AAV 
 2 Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) Tracking Systems (NTS)  
(HQMC, 2015) 
Additionally, the Air Combat Element of the MEU can utilize their 16 medium 
and heavy lift helicopters/tilt-rotor (12 x MV-22, 4 x CH-53) to move logistics supplies 
throughout the affected area.   
6. Communication 
Similar to the logistics assets of TNI AL and the MEU, communication assets of 
the HA/DR responders from the Indonesian Navy and USMC MEU are utilized 
throughout the spectrum of operations. The same equipment is utilized to gain and 
maintain connectivity in each of the support categories to include Medical, Sustenance, 
Habitat and Infrastructure. TNI AL has several long range communication assets that can 
be deployed throughout a disaster area. The headquarters element utilizes their Very 
Small Aperture Satellite (VSAT) and Broad Global Area Network satellite terminals 
(BGAN) to create a central communications hub. Single Side Band (SSB) radio 
multiband units, repeater links, global positioning systems, and handheld individual 
radios are utilized by smaller units to the main TNI AL communications hub (BNPB, 
2010). The key takeaway from the MEU communication architecture is that once the 
MEU has disembarked the ARG, they are capable of conducting Command and Control 
Operations through two separate and potentially disaggregated locations. The two 
Command and Control Operations Centers (COCs) are connected to the remainder of the 
MEU and the ARG with multiple Very High Frequency (VHF), High Frequency (HF) 
and Ultra-High Frequency (UHF) Satellite Communication links for voice and limited 
data communication. The COCs also have a Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router 
network (NIPR), and a Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPR) for unclassified 
and classified Internet access provided through the utilization of a BGAN. Once the 
COCs are established, the portions of the MEU working throughout the affected region 
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can remain in constant communication via their organic Mobile Radio Communication 
(MRC) vehicles, installed Blue-Force Tracker (BFT) devices, man packable VHF, UHF 
and Satellite Communication radios and hand held Iridium Satellite Phones (HQMC, 
2015). 
The following is a sample of what the 31st MEU advertised as their 
communication asset availability for HA/DR response:  
 10 x Mobile Radio Communication (MRC-148) Vehicles with Very High 
Frequency (VHF), High Frequency (HF) and Satellite Communication 
(SATCOM) (voice and data) support ashore  
 Two COCs with full spectrum of core services to include NIPR, SIPR, and 
Data Source Name (DSN) phone service  
 16 x MRC-145 Vehicles with VHF, HF and SATCOM ashore  
 3 x BGAN for mobile broadband NIPR, and  
 Mobile voice communication VIA UHF SATCOM and Iridium SatPhone 
(31st MEU, 2005) 
 
C. CAPABILITY SHORTFALLS 
We identified HA/DR capabilities gaps by examining the total requirements 
developed from the notional scenario outline in section 5A in order to define the 
appropriate response of the Indonesian Navy and the USMC MEU. We applied the 
demand information from this scenario in the support categories developed in Table 15 to 
include Medical, Sustenance, Habitat and Infrastructure. The capabilities of the 
Indonesian Navy were then applied to this demand, creating a final gap into which we 
leveraged the capabilities of the USMC MEU and in some cases the associated ARG.   
Utilizing the notional scenario as a representation of supply and the capabilities  





Table 18.   TNI AL and MEU Response Capability Matrix 
 Personnel Material Logistics Communication 
 MEU TNI MEU TNI MEU TNI MEU TNI 
Medical         
Sustenance         
Habitat         
Infrastructure         
 
No Capability  Insufficient Capability  Sufficient Capability 
 
Based on the capability data we find that there are several gaps and shortfalls. 
Gaps are depicted by an empty circle, which represents the absence of a critical capability 
from both the Indonesian Navy and the United States Marine Corps. Shortfalls are 
represented by a partially shaded circle and denote a critical capability that provides an 
insufficient amount of support to meet baseline scenario requirements. Completely 
shaded circles indicate sufficient capabilities in marked categories. With this analysis we 
found zero gaps, fourteen categories that are considered insufficient, and two categories 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. PROPOSED COURSES OF ACTION 
We quantified the impact of the USMC MEU and Indonesian naval assets by 
basing demand priority on the resources that have the greatest effect in the preservation 
of human lives. The shortfalls and potential gaps observed in the previous section lead us 
to possible remedies for mitigating identified gaps between the potential demand and 
available supply in an Indonesian HA/DR scenario. To address these shortfalls we have 
identified three areas for increasing response capability in order to decrease the negative 
impacts of a disaster. Our research ranks the delivery of medical assistance and 
sustenance as the two most important contributors providing critical support to large 
effected populations. The communication and logistical support required for the 
expedient distribution of these two elements serves as the greatest challenge during 
HA/DR response operations and represent the most significant recommended courses of 
action. These include the procurement of additional vertical lift assets by the Indonesian 
Navy, the pre-positioning of critical relief supplies, and the proactive measure of building 
population resiliency through continued disaster education and training.  In Figure 10, we 
utilized a cost impact matrix to depict the relationship between potential benefits derived 
from implemented improvements against the associated cost to acquire this improvement. 
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Figure 10.  HA/DR COA Cost/Impact Matrix 
 
 
1. Increasing the Capacity of Indonesian Vertical Lift Assets (High 
Cost/Major Impact) 
Vertical lift assets provide the greatest impact in reaching remote or isolated 
population centers and in the evacuation of critically injured personnel. Vertical lift also 
requires the largest capital contribution to obtain and maintain the capability. The 
acquisition of additional vertical lift assets by the Indonesian Navy would directly impact 
their logistics and communication capabilities presented in Table 19. 
Table 19.   Impact of Vertical Lift Acquisition by TNI AL 
 
 
Inadequate transportation infrastructure, sporadic population dispersion, and 
challenging terrain are the core elements that drive the vertical lift requirement. Rotary 
winged aircraft serve as versatile platforms to provide logistical support for the entire 
spectrum of HA/DR demand. These assets transport medical supplies, personnel and 
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equipment to remote regions without runways or prepared landing zones. The MEU’s 
combined vertical lift assets can transport a total of 260,000 pounds (160 pallets) of 
material or 1500 passengers per day. This equates to over 90,000 MREs or 30,000 
gallons of water per day, which can deliver 100 percent of food surge capacity or 25% of 
total water surge capacity. If the Indonesian Navy is successful in the acquisition of 
Chinook medium-lift helicopters their ability to distribute needed supplies will increase 
while their reliance on external military or civilian helicopters will decrease. 
2. Pre-positioning Critical Material 
Pre-positioning supplies also provides a major impact in the preservation of lives 
during the first phases of a disaster. This provides the ability to quickly receive and 
distribute food, water, shelter, and medicine to the affected population. Additionally, the 
availability of these critical supplies in an accessible location will reduce the strain on the 
overall supply chain as additional items are surged to the disaster site. The highlighted 
categories in Table 20 show the potential gains resulting from a tailored pre-positioning 
program.  
Table 20.   Impact of Regional Pre-positioning on HA/DR Capabilities 
 
 
Two of the primary categories that require pre-positioning are sustenance and 
habitat. In the right conditions, both of these items can be stored for extended periods of 
time and require less preventative maintenance than mechanical equipment.   
Dehydration is the second leading cause of death during a nature disaster. 
Humans require an average of 2–4 gallons of potable water per day for consumption, 
hygiene and basic cooking needs (Sphere, 2011). Bottled water or water purification 
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(mechanical or chemical) are both options for pre-positioning, but will require vastly 
different storage and life cycle costs. Prolonged exposure to the harsh tropical climate of 
the South-Pacific is another leading cause of human suffering during a natural disaster. 
The acquisition of additional shelter units will provide needed relief from the elements 
for the affected population. Tent and tarpaulins are an effective option that is easy to 
store, transport and construct.  
Supply pre-positioning has been conducted by the Marine Corps with both afloat 
prepositioned ships and at fixed locations in the United States and other strategic 
locations to include Norway. The Marine Corps Pre-positioning Program—Norway 
(MCPP-N) is an example of USMC equipment staged in a strategic location to help 
counter a potentially aggressive enemy force. Key tenets to the Norwegian-based 
prepositioned stockpiles include: 
 The Norwegians bear a large portion of the financial burden for the 
storage, maintenance and system upgrades that take place on the 
prepositioned equipment (HQMC, 2009). The Memorandum of 
Understanding between the United States and Norway states that “the 
Government of the Kingdom of Norway contribution will be limited to 
half of the total costs incurred or the ceiling set in U.S. dollars to be 
negotiated by the Parties, whichever is less” (Department of State, 2005). 
 The prepositioned locations are secure. This includes both a secure storage 
location (underground caves) and a stable political environment. 
 Joint exercises (Exercise COLD RESPONSE) are conducted to develop 
and refine standard operating procedures (SOPs) while establishing 
working relationships between Norwegian and Marine Corps forces.  
 The Government of the Kingdom of Norway (GoKoN) provides the 
personnel, equipment and infrastructure to support the Reception, Staging, 
Onward Movement and Integration (RSO&I) of the prepositioned 
equipment (HQMC, 2009). 
We propose a similar prepositioned model in Southeast Asia. Instead of 
stockpiling equipment needed to fight an enemy, material utilized for HA/DR scenarios 
would be stored in a static location. An agreement of this nature could effectively stage 
needed material while continuing to strengthen political and economic ties between the 
United States and South Pacific nations. 
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3. Increasing Population Resiliency 
Early detection and response to slow onset disasters such as tsunamis can also 
have a substantial impact on the subsequent demand for HA/DR related assistance. The 
United Nations for International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), defines a 
disaster-resilient community as a society which is capability of preventing, confronting, 
and recovering from disaster threats in a timely manner (Valency & Lazarte, 2007). This 
definition can include many widely varied projects. Examples that have been 
implemented include the development of low cost solutions to strengthen and renovate 
homes in typhoon prone areas and the augmentation modern scientific instrumentation 
with local historical knowledge to build early warning systems (Valency & Lazarte, 
2007). Solidarity and mutual relationships within resilient communities can encourage 
the implementation of these resiliency programs, giving priority to the common good. 
Categories in which an increase in population resiliency can potentially decrease the 
dependence on outside assistance during the initial disaster response phases is shown in 
Table 21. 
Table 21.   Impact of Population Resiliency Programs on HA/DR Capacities 
 
 
Building resiliency is one of the lowest cost options to provide a measurable 
impact to disaster affected communities, but it must be implemented and fully engrained 
within a group prior to the strike of a disaster. Because of the pre-disaster requirements of 
resiliency, existing programs need to be evaluated for effectiveness, reworked or created 
where needed to cover probably future scenarios and expanded to reach the most isolated 
communities. This will include a unified effort from the host country and partnered aid 
organizations. 
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B. ADDITIONAL RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
Throughout the conduct of this project, additional research opportunities were 
identified.  This related research would build upon this work and provide supplementary 
knowledge for HA/DR responders and response organizations.  This research would not 
be limited too, but could include the following: 
1. Develop a model to determine the most suitable location for future pre-
positioning sites in the vicinity of Indonesia or its ASEAN partners. 
2. Cost benefit analysis comparing the pre-positioning of critical material 
against the immediate acquisition and transportation of the same types of 
material post-disaster. 
3. Analyze applicable costs (to both the USMC and Norwegian Military) 
associated with the prepositioned stockpiles in Norway in order to apply a 
similar model towards HA/DR stockpiles in the South Pacific. 
4. Develop future joint exercises between the MEU and Indonesian naval 
counterparts to further enhance coordination between the two forces for 
HA/DR response. 
5. Cost analysis for the acquisition and maintenance costs associated with the 
procurement of Chinook rotary-wing assets by the Indonesia Ministry of 
Defense for the Indonesian Navy. 
6. Conduct an inclusive analysis of regionally effective NGOs to ascertain a 
potential level of post-disaster supply. 
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